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The WHO remains a linchpin in global 
health not least in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic. It relies on contributions from 
donors and member states,1 but there have 
been well- documented issues with the models 
of funding adopted, the size and sources 
of financial contributions and donor influ-
ence in vertically driving specific priorities,2 
in contrast to the wider health governance 
mandate of the WHO.
Adequate resources and independence are 
critical and interlinked. The need to address 
major public health issues may conflict with 
vested interests such as powerful transna-
tional companies that serve as the vectors of 
non- communicable diseases such as diabetes, 
heart disease and cancer.3 The WHO there-
fore needs the resources to independently 
and transparently intervene to improve 
health, prevent harm and tackle inequalities, 
consistent with its mission, whether the causes 
of poor health are natural or manmade.
This is why the recent launch of the WHO 
Foundation, established with the explicit 
intention of broadening the WHO donor 
pool, appears problematic. It seeks donations 
from members of the public, high- net- worth 
individuals (HNWI) and from corporations. 
It aims to constitute an ‘independent entity’ 
that can accept these funds and, in turn, 
support WHO activities.
The WHO Foundation thereby realises a 
longstanding, and highly contested, ambi-
tion within the leadership of WHO. This 
ambition was central to Margaret Chan’s 
reform agenda, with her 2011 report on 
future financing envisaging widening WHO’s 
resource base by inter alia developing ‘inno-
vative financing mechanisms’ and drawing on 
‘foundations and the private and commercial 
sector, without compromising independence 
or adding to organizational fragmenta-
tion’. Widespread concerns about the ability 
to reconcile WHO’s independence with 
increased engagement with commercial 
actors were at the centre of the protracted 
debates around developing a new Frame-
work of Engagement with Non- State Actors 
(FENSA) that followed.4
While FENSA principles have themselves 
been criticised as insufficient to protect 
against conflicts of interest,5 6 concerns about 
the adequacy of governance mechanisms for 
the WHO Foundation are heightened by a 
lack of clarity about the applicability of FENSA 
norms and practices. Indeed, the logic of the 
Foundation suggests that its operations will 
extend beyond the scope and protections of 
FENSA in concerning ways.
The affiliation agreement signed between 
the WHO and the Foundation in May 2020 is 
clear (para 11.3) that the Foundation will not 
generally receive ‘funding from governments 
or governmental entities or philanthropic 
organizations that have or can provide funds 
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directly to WHO’.7 Restricting the Foundation’s activities 
to donations that WHO cannot accept doubtless reflects 
operational and procedural issues, but also points to the 
potential for it to accept funding from sources that would 
be deemed inappropriate for WHO itself. The agreement 
provides little reassurance in this regard: the only sources 
of funding explicitly excluded are the tobacco and arms 
industries, and while there is a commitment to ensure 
that all funding ‘does not pose a conflict of interest for 
WHO’ (11.4) in the context of Foundation initiatives this 
is qualified as avoiding conflicts ‘that cannot be mitigated 
in coordination with WHO’. (14.2). A similar principle 
was espoused in an interview by the new CEO of the 
Foundation, who stated: ‘There will be some industries 
that are off limits, because it’s been important for the 
WHO to make clear that they keep a lack of engagement 
with the tobacco industry and with the arms industry, but 
those are typically the exceptions’.8
This narrow approach contrasts with work by the 
WHO and other organisations to better assess conflicts 
of interest in identifying suitable partnerships, such as 
in the context of globally consolidated food or alcohol 
producers, made more difficult precisely because such 
commercial actors have been found to actively oppose 
such regulatory and conflict of interest safeguards.9 10
In parallel, and remarkably given above, the Founda-
tion has been launched, and has been accepting dona-
tions, in the apparent absence of an agreed conflict 
of interest policy or standard operating procedures 
regarding the suitability of donors. A published Q&A 
document states the Foundation ‘will follow FENSA prin-
ciples when accepting donations and vetting donors’.11 
However, FENSA principles explicitly do not offer 
contributors the possibility for advising, influencing or 
participating in the management or implementation of 
operational activities. This conflicts with the WHO Foun-
dations stated intention to ‘craft individual donations’ 
and provides for donors ‘participating in the design of 
their engagement and interact with the implementing 
partners they support’.
Taken together, this is concerning.
In considering the likely trajectory and implications 
of the Foundation, it can be instructive to review the 
COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund for the WHO, 
with which it has structural and functional similarities. 
Perhaps understandably given its rapid establishment, 
the COVID-19 Fund provides limited information on 
governance issues, but it does preclude accepting funding 
from the alcohol industry, invoking the due diligence 
processes of its operational partners the UN Foundation 
and Swiss Philanthropy (a notable omission in WHO 
Foundation documents). The list of corporate actors that 
have donated to the COVID-19 Fund, such as PepsiCo, 
Starbucks and global snack foods giant Mondelez Inter-
national, remains concerning.12 Such donations clearly 
play an important legitimation function for unhealthy 
commodity industries, sometimes called healthwashing,13 
and funding the WHO Foundation would provide 
corporate actors an opportunity to directly advance stra-
tegic and commercial objectives.
The justification for the WHO Foundation’s separate 
legal status partly rests on a claim that it can ensure inde-
pendence from undue influence, by creating ‘a more 
credible firewall that protects WHO’.11 Yet if the Foun-
dation is to be successful it must generate funds at a level 
that could threaten operational independence. It is not 
difficult to envisage a scenario in which donations from 
alcohol or ultra- processed food producers, for example, 
come to exceed the extremely modest provision in the 
WHO budget for alcohol control and obesity initia-
tives. And it is not alarmist to suggest that such depen-
dence creates potential for a form of regulatory chill, 
particularly in the context of increasingly severe fiscal 
constraints, that could further jeopardise fragile commit-
ments to advancing contested measures such as sugar 
taxes14 15 or regulating alcohol marketing.16
The limited accountability mechanisms provided for 
in the affiliation agreement seem insufficient to address 
such concerns. Given that the Foundation’s task is 
defined as ‘to maximise net financial contributions’, its 
Board seems incentivised to take a minimalist approach 
to scrutinising donations.
The use of foundations to direct such funds is not a 
unique arrangement. In the USA, where corporate 
and HNWI philanthropy play a larger role compared 
with Europe, both the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) have similar foundations. However, how funding 
is solicited, from whom and for what has important impli-
cations. The US model shows the challenges in selecting 
donors with interests aligned with that of the public insti-
tution. A lack of safeguards make it possible for donors 
with a conflict of interest to guide the activities of the 
parent agency in ways that favour their interests, through 
funding particular streams of work, and through under-
mining, implicitly, or explicitly, streams of work that 
conflict with business interests.
For example, Coca- Cola, via its funding of the CDC 
Foundation and the International Life Science Insti-
tute, funded research and charity projects with a focus 
on physical activity. Through such initiatives, Coca- Cola 
was able to cultivate strong ties with the CDC, and seek 
to undermine work on diet, including through lobbying 
the WHO on sugar taxes.14 Similarly, a high- profile study 
on the effects of alcohol on health co- funded by alcohol 
producers and the NIH National Institute of Alcohol 
Abuse and Alcoholism was found to be compromised 
in its development and design in ways that favoured the 
industry, leading to its cancellation amid public outcry.17
It is for these reasons the WHO itself has been devel-
oping conflict of interest tools to ensure that public good 
is not undermined by private profit. The fact that these 
tools provoke resistance among entities with a conflict 
of interest in health underlines their importance. These 
risks contrast with the troubling reality that the WHO 
Foundation is already soliciting donations, from the 
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public, wealthy individuals and from corporations, in 
the absence of a clear conflict of interest policy. We were 
unable to identify any published policy on donor trans-
parency, in contrast to the norms for other such organ-
isations. Earmarked donations from corporate partners 
are welcomed, but the way in which such interactions are 
conducted, when they are assessed for conflicts of interest 
or how their eventual impact is measured, is not stated.
If the current pandemic has taught us anything, it is 
that prevention is better than the cure, and that the WHO 
forms a crucial element of coordinating and informing 
that prevention globally. The WHO cannot be seen to be 
sacrificing its independence or impartiality to commer-
cial determinants of health in order to access greater 
resources.
The current signs from the WHO Foundation are trou-
bling, and suggest that the spirit and letter of FENSA, 
developed in recognition of the central importance of 
managing conflicts of interest, are being sidelined. The 
reputational risk this could pose for the WHO is consid-
erable, particularly at this crucial juncture, and is at odds 
with other efforts by the WHO to improve the manage-
ment of conflicts of interest in global health. The lessons 
of past failed initiatives can ill afford to be ignored. 
Global health deserves a far firmer foundation.
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